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THE TRANSFER OF REMAINDERS-WITH
MORE PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO
THE LAW OF MISSOURI
INTRODUCTORY
The common law gave to vested remainders many of the quali-
ties of present estates, and most of the questions arising in
connection with their transfer have long been free from difficulty.
But contingent remainders occupied such a precarious place in
the law long after they were first recognized as legal interests,'
that all questions as to their transferability were approached with
exceeding reluctance. The contingent remainderrnan had only
a mere possibility of an estate, and the employment of such a
description was in itself sufficient to conjure difficulty, for pos-
sibility to the common-law lawyer was a dangerous word. A
dealing in possibilities smacked of wager and its consequent taint.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when all conveyances of
interests in land were formal and restricted and when uncertain
future interests were not favored, artificial rules for the alienation
of contingent remainders took root; and although conveyances
have been freed from most of the feudal restrictions and uncer-
tain interests have come into greater favor, the force of the
artificial rules has not entirely spent itself. A special treatment
of the transfer of remainders seems to be justified, therefore,
with especial reference to a few recent Missouri decisions.2
In dealing with contingent remainders it is necessary to keep
constantly in mind the nature of the contingency, and it will be
convenient to distinguish two classes of contingencies: (i) those
which affect the determination of the person who may come into
the enjoyment of the estate, and (2) those which affect the
completeness of the title accruing to an ascertained person in
whose favor the limitation was made. Typifying the first class,
I The recognition of contingent remainders was probably prior to 143o.
Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 134. But it is possible that contingent
remainders to uncertain persons were not allowed until later. See 14
LAW QUART. REV. 234, 238.
2 Particularly, Hauser v. Murray (1914) 256 Mo. 58; Eckle v. Ryland
(1914) 256 Mo. 426; Tevis v. Tevis (1914) 259 Mo. ig; and Stockwell
v. Stockwell (1914) 262 Mo. 671.
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a devise to A for life, remainder in fee to the heirs of X, a living
person-no definite person can be said to have the contingent
remainder because of the possibility that so many various persons
may come to be clothed with the right; typifying the second
class, a devise to A for life, remainder in fee to B if he survive
X-the remainder is in B, although it is an incomplete interest
pending the contingency. If a remainder is conferred on B,
who may be heir apparent of X, on the contingency that he
survive X as heir, we have a case clearly of the second class,
although it closely resembles the typical case of the first class.
This distinction was made by Fearne throughout his treatise,'
and it is important that it be observed in this study for historical
reasons at least. The distinction is sometimes expressed by
referring to B in cases of the second class as having "a vested
interest in a contingent remainder,"' but because of its tendency
toward confusion that expression should be avoided.
The various methods of transfer will be treated under the
titles of intestate succession, testamentary disposition and inter
vivos alienation.
TRANSFER BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION
A vested remainder was descendible at common law5 and will
of course pass to the heirs of the remainderman under the
modem statute of descents.8  In Jones v. Waters,7 a vested
remainder was sold by an administrator under order of the
S Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 370. From Fearne, it was adopted
in Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests, p. 172. Fearne's
fourth class of contingent remainders was "to a person not ascertained
or not in being." See 2 Preston, Abstracts, p. 95.
4 See Putnam v. Story (1882) 132 Mass. 205; 2 Washburn, Real
Property (6th ed.) § 1557; Love v. Lindsteat (Or., 1915) 147 Pac. 935.
In Rozier v. Graham (1898) 146 Mo. 352, the court used the expression,
"Tho a fee may vest as a contingent remainder." The distinction is
sometimes expressed by a reference to the contingent remainder's vesting
"in interest" while yet contingent. See Cummings v. Stearns (1894) 161
Mass. 5o6.
5 Watkins, Descents, p. 4.
6 Revised Statutes 1909, § 332, "when any person having title to any
real estate of inheritance." Reinders v. Koppelmann (1878) 68 Mo. 482;
Waddell v. Waddell (1889) 99 Mo. 338; Chew v. Keller (1889) ioo Mo.
362. A reversion is a descendible interest under this statute. Payne v.
Payne (1893) rig Mo. 174.
S(1853) 17 Mo. 587. The "county court" was probably the probate
court.
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county court. In Wommack v. Whitmores land was conveyed
to X in trust for A for life, remainder to her children; B, a
daughter of A, predeceased A, leaving a daughter, C, who was
her heir and C predeceased A, leaving her father (B's husband)
as her heir: it was held that C's father took the remainder given
to B, by descent from C upon whom it had descended from B.
This case is of interest because of the rule of the common law
as stated by Fearne,9 that one "who claims a fee simple by
descent from one who was first purchaser of the reversion or
remainder expectant on a freehold estate, must make himself
heir to such purchaser, at the time when that reversion or
remainder falls into possession." While the Missouri court
clearly did not have Fearne's statement in mind, the result of
the decision is probably not consistent with an application of the
rule, for B's husband was probably not heir to B at the time of
A's death. The court seems to have been of the opinion that it
was unnecessary for one claiming a remainder by descent to
make himself heir to the first taker of the remainder as of the
time of its vesting in possession, and this seems far more satis-
factory than the artificial rule of descent which would have the
effect of converting a vested remainder into a contingent
remainder in the hands of the first remainderman's heir.10 The
8 (1874) 58 Mo. 448. Nothing turns on the fact that the remainder
was equitable.
9Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 561. See Goodright v. Searle
(1756) 2 Wils. 29, upon which Fearne's statement is based, and Doe d.
Andrew v. Hutton (18o4) 3 B. & P. 643, where it is cited with approval.
See also Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests, p. 174.
Goodright v. Searle was followed by STORY, J., in Barnitz's Lessee v. Casey
(1813) 7 Cranch 456. For comment on this case, see Bingham, Descents,
p, 223. See also Buck v. Lontz (1878) 49 Md. 439; Garrison v. Hill
(1894) 79 Md. 75; Jenkins v. Bonsall (1911) II6 Md. 629, where the rule
was applied to a remainder in personalty; Lawrence v. Pitt (1854) 46
N. C. 344; Payne v. Rosser (1875) 53 Ga. 662. But outside of Maryland
the tendency of modern decisions is away from the rule of the common
law as stated by Fearne, and where possible it will be found that the
statute of descents has abrogated the rule. See Early v. Early (1904) r34
N. C. 258; Oliver v. Powell (igoi) 114 Ga. 592; North v. Graham (19o8)
235 Ill. 178. See also 3 ILLINOIS LAw REv. 185. For the rule in Eng-
land since the Wills Act of 1837, see Ingilby v. Amcotts (1956) 21 Beav.
585.
10 In Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests, p. 174, it is
said that a remainder "to B and his heirs" must pass to one who is
heir to B at the time of its vesting in possession because of the limitation
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terms of the Missouri statute of descents offer sufficient justifica-
tion for repudiating the old rule, for the statutory descent is
from one "having title."
A contingent remainder was descendible at common law wher-
ever the person was certain, i. e., where the contingency did not
involve a determination of the person who was to take. Thus, a
devise to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs if C survive A;
B clearly has a descendible interest during the lifetime of C and
A, although it will of course be defeated by C's failure to sur-
vive A. But the nature of the contingency may involve a
survival of the remainderman beyond a certain time, and it is
equally clear that such a remainderman has no descendible
interest prior to such survival, even though he be an ascertained
person: for example, a devise to A for life, remainder to B and
his heirs if B survive A-obviously B has no interest which can
descend to his heirs prior to his survival of A, i. e., prior to its
becoming an estate in possession, for B's death during A's life-
time will entirely preclude the vesting of the remainder. Such
a contingent remainder is not descendible because of the nature
of the contingency. 1 If land is devised to A for life, remainder
to the unborn son of B (a single person), it is unnecessary to
deal with any question of descendibility of the remainder prior
to its becoming vested. If the devise is to A for life, remainder
to the heirs of X, clearly, also, no question can arise as to the
descendibility of the remainder while it is contingent, for the
death of a possible remainderman during the life of X would
preclude his being an heir and thus destroy the possibility of his
becoming the remainderman.
But more difficulty is encountered when the remainder is con-
ferred on an unascertained person or persons, and where the
death of a certain person or persons is not determinative of his
or their being the person or persons who may later be ascertained
to be the object or objects of the limitation. Thus, a devise to A
itself; but this seems to neglect the principle that the words "and his
heirs" are words of limitation of B's estate only. A more plausible
statement of the rule is to be found in Watkins, Descents, p. i18. The
rule had its origin in the common law rule that descent should be traced
from the person last actually seised, or from the first purchaser. See
Early v. Early (19o4) r34 N. C. 258, 265.
11 This exception is clearly stated in Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p.
364. See also Hennessy v. Patterson (i88s) 85 N. Y. 91; Brown v.
Williams (i858) 5 P. I. 3o8.
. 27
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for life, remainder in fee to the youngest child of X born prior
to A's death; X has two children B and C; has C, the younger of
them, a contingent remainder? So long as X lives, he may have
other children. C seems to have a contingency of a vested remain-
der rather than a remainder on a contingency. 12  This distinction
is slight, if not fanciful, 13 but it has been seized upon and made
the basis for a supposed rule that a remainder to an unascer-
tained person is not descendible.14 This rule has been recognized
by many American writers, 5 but Professor Kales, whose opinion
is entitled to great weight, seems to recognize no such exception
to the general rule that contingent remainders are descendible
unless the death of the remainderman precludes the later vesting
12 It may be likened to an expectancy of succession to an ancestor's
property as his heir, during the ancestor's lifetime. It would seem there-
fore to fall within Challis' classification of "absolutely bare possibilities"
as opposed to "possibilities coupled with an interest," which latter phrase
includes the ordinary contingent remainders. See Challis, Real Property
(3d ed.) p. 76, note. See also i Preston, Estates, p. 76; 2 Preston,
Abstracts, pp. 95, 204.
'I See Parkhurst v. Smith (1741) Willes 327, 338; Doe d. Calkin v.
Tomkinson (1813) 2 M. & S., 165; Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) p. 234.
In Doe d. Calkin v. Tomkinson, Lord Ellenborough asked, "How can a
person be said to have a contingent interest, when it is uncertain whether
he is the person who will be entitled to have it or not." In i Preston,
Estates, p. 76, the distinction is made the basis for a division between
possibilities coupled with an interest and those not coupled with an
interest. See also 2 Preston, Abstracts, pp. 95, 204.
14 Watkins, Descents, p. 4; Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 370;
Doe d. Calkin v. Tomkinson (1813) 2 M. & S., 165. Cf. Roe d. Noden V.
Griffith (1767) I W. BI., 6o5; Leake, Property in Land (2d ed.), p. 241 n.;
2 Preston, Abstracts, p. 95.
152 Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.) § 1557; 4 Kent, Commentaries
(I4th ed.) p. 261; Tiffany, Real Property, § 129. In Brown v. Williams
(1858) 5 R. I. 3o9, AMEs, C. J., approved the distinction by saying that
"if the contingency is to decide who is to be the object of the contingent
limitation, as the person, or of the persons, to or amongst whom the
contingent or future interest is directed, as it cannot be determined in
whom the interest is, until the contingency happens, no one can claim
before the contingency decides the matter, that any interest is vested in
him to descend from, and hence to be transferred or devised by him."
See also Roundtree v. Roundtree (1887) 26 S. C. 45o; Mohn v. Mohn
(91o) 148 Ia. 288; Fisher v. Wagner (19o9) iog Md. 443. The Geoergia
statute provides for the descent of a contingent remainder "when the
contingency is not as to the person but as to the event." Park's Code,
§ 3677. See Morse v. Proper (1888) 82 Ga. 13.
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of the remainder.' Invariably, when the supposed rule is stated,
it is connected with a discussion of cases in which the death of
the remainderman would preclude a later vesting. It is doubtful
whether the rule has been applied in any case where the con-
tingency did not have to do with the remainderman's surviving the
particular tenant. In the case supposed, if X should die without
having had other children, C's death before X ought not to result
in a defeat of the gift to X's youngest child. Yet this would be
the effect of applying the supposed rule that a remainder to an
unascertained person is not descendible. It is submitted that the
authorities do not clearly establish such a rule and that its appli-
cation at the present time would mean an unfortunate revival of
the feudal refinements as to possibilities.
The Missouri cases on the point are disappointing because of
their failure to notice the distinction above made. In Delassus
v. Gatewood,17 there was a devise to the testator's widow for life
and at her death to the testator's "children that are alive, or their
bodily children." One son of the testator predeceased his mother
leaving a widow and one son, and the latter died before the
termination of the life estate. The court held that the remainder
was contingent in the testator's children, but it would seem to
have become vested in the "bodily children" of any child dying
during the lifetime of the testator's widow. On this latter point,
the court was by no means clear; it seems to have treated the
remainder of the "bodily children" as contingent on their sur-
viving the testator's widow, for it held that the widow of the
testator's son took nothing by descent from her child upon the
latter's death during the lifetime of the testator's widow. If the
16 Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 72, n. 27. In Re Cresswell (1883)
24 Ch. D. 1O2, KAY, J., said, "As far as I can discover, the only case
in which a contingent future interest is not transmissible is where the
being in existence when the contingency happens is an essential part of
the description of the person who is to take." This is quoted in 2 Jarman,
Wills (6th ed.) 1353. The supposed necessity that the remainderman be
ascertained finds no countenance from Jarman. The strongest authority
for the supposed rule is to be found in Preston's works.. 2 Preston,
Abstracts, pp. 95, 205; I Preston, Estates, p. 76. In Chess' Appeal (1878)
87 Pa. St. 362, it is said that a contingent remainder is transmissible
unless the contingency relates to the capacity of the remainderman to take.
11 (i88o) 71 Mo. 371. The situation in Ruddell v. Wren (19o4) 2o8 Ill.
5o8 was very similar, though the remainder was more clearly contingent.
Whether the contingency was such as to preclude the descent of the
remainder, quaere. The court's opinion clearly made it so.
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remainder of the "bodily children" was contingent, the grand-
son's death during the continuance of the life estate precluded
a later vesting. In any event, therefore, the case stands for
nothing as to the descendibility of a contingent remainder,
although the court seen%, to have thought it was applying a rule
that contingent remainders are not descendible.'
8
The statement was made obiter in Payne v. Paynei that "a
remainder can only be acquired by purchase, and never by
descent"; but this should be taken to refer to the creation of
remainders, rather than to their devolution after creation. In
Sullivan v. Garesche,20 the remainder was given to "surviving
children" and it was held that this meant surviving at the time
of the termination of the particular estate, so that the death of a
possible remainderman theretofore necessarily precluded the vest-
ing of the interest and there was nothing to descend. In Hauser
v. Murray,21 the flat statement was made that "contingent remain-
ders are not descendible," but again the court was considering a
remainder to the "bodily heirs" of a life tenant and the person
from whom descent was claimed failed to become an heir by his
non-survival.
These decisions leave the question of descendibility unsettled
in Missouri. But it is submitted that the way is still open to the
Missouri court to declare that whenever the person to take is
ascertained a contingent remainder is descendible unless the sur-
vival of the deceased is itself a part of the contingency. The
law in other states is settled this far.22  It would undoubtedly
be simpler if it were unnecessary to add, "Whenever the person
18 The court cited Bingham, Descents, pp. 222, 223, where the opinion
is expressed that contingent remainders are not descendible, and the
authorities are reviewed very speciously, there being no citation of Fearne.
In view of the comment here made on Delassus v. Gatewood, it is sub-
mitted that the case was improperly cited in Washburn, Real Property
(6th ed.) § 1557 note. Cf. Rindquist v. Young (1892) 112 Mo. 25.
19 (893) I19 Mo. I74.
20 (191o) 229 Mo. 496.
21 (1913) 256 Mo. 58, 97. The court cites for the statement quoted
Delassus v. Gatewood, already discussed, and Dickerson v. Dickerson
(19o7) 211 Mo. 483; in the latter case no question of descendibility was
involved.
The same confusion seems to exist in the Illinois decisions. See Kales,
Future Interests in Illinois, § 73.
22 See Winslow v. Goodwin (1884) 7 Metcalf (Mass.) 363; Clark v.
Cox (1894) 115 N. C. 93; Tiffany, Real Property, § 129; Kales, Future
Interests in Illinois, § 72.
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to take is ascertained," and it is submitted that this would involve
no departure from the common law as it has actually been applied
by the courts in England and America. If a contingent remainder
is held to descend, it may do so, however, subject to the rule of
Goodright v. Searle noted above.
23
Since there is no seisin of a contingent remainder, there can be
no dower or curtesy in it, and even the owner of a vested remain-
der does not have seisin so as to entitle his wife to dower.
24
TRANSFER BY TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION
It would seem that if a remainder is descendible it should also
be devisable,25 but devisability depends upon statute and is to
some extent a question of statutory construction. The early
English Statute of Wills gave a limited power of testamentary
disposition to persons "having or which hereafter shall have any
manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, holden," etc.28 This
was for many years construed not to include contingent remain-
ders, the word "having" being read to mean "seized of" ;"7 but
the contrary has now long been held in England and the statute
is 'held to mean "that every person who has a valuable interest in
lands shall have the power of disposing of it by will." 28  The
2 3Ante, note 9. See Barnitz v. Casey (1813) 7 Cranch 456. Cf. Fisher
v. Wagner (igog) iog Md. 243, 251. The Missouri statute provides a
course of descent "where any person having title to any real estate of
inheritance" dies. Ante, note 5. A contingent remainderman would
seem to be such a person, in view of the interpretation of a similar
expression in the statute on conveyances made in Godman v. Simmons
(892) 113 Mo. 122.
24 Scribner, Dower (2d ed.) p. 321; Fearne, Contingent Remaindeis, p.
346; Cochran v. Thomas (1895) 131 Mo. 258; Von Arb v. Thomas (i9O1)
163 Mo. 33. In Payne v. Payne (1893) iig Mo. 174, it was held that the
widow of a reversioner had no dower in the reversion.
25 See Roe d. Noden v. Grifflth (1767) I W. Blackstone 605; Ingilby v.
Amcotts (i856) 21 Beav. 585. Descendibility is not an accurate test of
devisability. Rights of entry for condition broken are descendible but
probably not devisable. See 5 Law Series, MissouRi BULLETiN, p. 15; 9
COLUMB A LAw REv. 548.
28 (154o) 32 Henry VIII, c. i. As amended in 34 and 35 Henry VIII,
c. 5, § 4, this statute expressly included remainders.
27 Bishop v. Fountaine (I6g6) 3 Lev. 427; Ives v. Legge (743) 3 D. &
E. 488. These cases are discussed in Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p.
366; Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests, p. i8o.
28 Jones v. Roe (789) 3 D. & E. 88; Fearne, Contingent Remainders,
pp. 366 et seq.
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more modem Wills Act" is quite explicit in permitting the devise
of any interest which would descend and of any contingent inter-
est "whether the testator may or may not be ascertained as the
person or one of the persons in whom the same may respectively
become vested." This would seem to authorize the devise of a
contingent remainder which might not be descendible because of
the non-ascertainment of the person in whom it may vest, but
English opinion does not seem clear on the point.30
Of course a contingent remainder cannot be devised by one
whose death precludes the later vesting of the interest,3 ' and it
seems that the same objection may be made to the devise of a
remainder, where the person to take is not ascertained, as was
made to its descendibility above.3 2  But subject to these excep-
tions, it is now generally held that vested and contingent remain-
ders are freely devisable, 3 and in some states this is confirmed
by statute. 3'
The Missouri statute permits a man to devise "all his estate,
real, personal and mixed and all interest therein," and a woman
to devise "her land, tenements or any descendible interests
therein."3 5  The decisions have not closely analysed the effect'of
29 (1837) i Vict. c. 26.
30A contrary view is expressed in Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Exec-
utory Interests, p. 181. But see I Jarman, Wills (6th ed) p. go. Fearne
may have considered such a remainder as devisable in equity independently
of statute. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 548.
3' Brown v. Williams (1858) 5 R. 1. 309.
32 But Professor Kales disapprives of any such reason for non-devis-
ability. See his Future Interests in Illinois, § 73 n. Cf. 2 Preston,
Abstracts, p. 95. In I Preston, Estates, p. 76, it is said that a remainder
to an unascertained person is a possibility not coupled with an interest
and is not devisable. In Fisher v. Wagner (19o9) lO9 Md. 243, the court
emphasized the fact that the contingency did not affect the ascertainment
of the person.
33Loring v. Arnold (1887) 15 R. I. 428; Chess' Appeal (1878) 87
Pa. St. 362; Kenyon v. See (1884) 94 N. Y. 563; Fisher v. Wagner.
(Md., 1909) 71 AtI. 999. See also Tiffany. Real Property, § 129; 9
COLUMBIA LAw RFv. 546.
34 See Reeves, Real Property, § 9o4. In Illinois, the statute is not explicit,
but contingent remainders are probably devisable. Cf. Harvard College
v. Balch (1898) 17, Ill. 275; and the comment in Kales, Future Interests
in Illinois, § 73. The Georgia statute making contingent remainders
descendible "when the contingency is not as to the person," Parks' Code
§ 3677, seems to apply by analogy to devises. Morse v. Proper (I888) 82
Ga. 13.
35 Revised Statutes, 1909, § § 535, 536. An early Missouri statute author-
ized the devise of all "estate, right, title and interest in possession, rever-
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this statute. There can be no doubt as to the devisability of a
vested remainder,s but there is much to lead the unwary to con-
clude that contingent remainders cannot be devised. Under the
terms of the statute there may be a difference whether the devise
is by a man or a woman, and only descendible remainders may
be devisable by a woman, thus opening up the uncertainty as to
what is descendible. However, it seems unlikely that the court
would favor such a distinction.
In Eckle v. Ryland," the court recognized the practical impos-
sibility of devising a contingent remainder where "the same event
which makes the will effective makes it impossible for the con-
tingency to happen," i. e., where the testator's death precludes the
vesting of any interest. Tevis v. Tevis"s presents more difficulty.
A testator disposed of certain land during the life of his son John,
and provided that on the death of John, another son, Nestor, or
his heirs, should have the right to purchase the land for a fixed
sum of money, and that the money or the land, depending on
Nestor's election, should "vest in the heirs of the body of John,
and if there shall be no heirs of his body then living, the money
or the land shall pass to and vest in" the testator's heirs at law.
There was nothing in the will to refer the determination of the
testator's heirs to the time of John's death, and it would seem
that the will had the effect of creating a contingent remainder in
the heirs of John's body subject to Nestor's right of purchase
(which did not effect a conversion), and that subject to the vest-
ing of this remainder, the heirs of the testator took the reversion
by descent and not by devise, 9 with the result that upon John's
sion or remainder." Revised Statutes, 1825, P. 79o. But this wording
was dropped in 1835. Revised Statutes, 1835, p. 617.
as Waddell v. Waddell (I889) 99 Mo. 338; Eckle v. Ryland (1913) 256
Mo. 424 (semble); Tiffany, Real Property, § I29.
3T (0913) 256 Mo. 424, 44o.
38 (914) 259 Mo. 19.
39 Where A devises land to B for life, and remainder to C if C survive
B, A's heirs take the reversion by descent subject to the contingent
remainder; Plunket v. Holmes (1658) 1 Lev. ii; Fearne, Contingent
Remainders, p. 351; and if A's will purports to confer the remainder
upon them it is so far void, for since they would take the same interest
by descent, the law gives no effect to that portion of the will. Challis,
Real Property (3d ed.) p. 239; Sanders, Uses (4th ed.) p. 133; Leake,
Property In Land (2d ed.) p. 124. It is not, therefore, a case of alternate
contingent remainders but a case of a descending reversion which is
subject to B's contingent remainder.
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death without bodily heirs the devisee of one of the testator's
heirs who predeceased John should have taken that heir's share
which was vested and therefore devisable. But the court held
that such a devisee took nothing, saying that the persons who
were to take on John's death without heirs of his body "could
not be determined until" that contingency happened. This would
make it seem that the court referred the determination of the
testator's heirs to the time of John's death in spite of its previous
declarations to the contrary, and if this is true the result of the
case is sound for the devisor never qualified as a member of
the class of objects of the limitation. But in the next breath the
court said that "such interest was therefore a contingent interest
and not devisable prior to the death of John," referring to Eckle
v. Ryland. If it was contingent on the death of John without
heirs of his body, such a contingency should not render it non-
devisable. It is impossible to know what was meant, and in view
of the court's failure to give any proper consideration to the gen-
eral question of the devisability of a contingent remainder, Tevis
v. Tevis must not be taken to stand for the proposition that con-
tingent remainders are not devisable.
4 0
With this scant authority, -the question is by no means settled
in Missouri and it is open to the court to hold that contingent
remainders are devisable wherever the person to take is ascer-
tained, unless the death of the testator is an event which pre-
cludes the vesting of the interest. For the reasons stated above,
it is submitted that it should not be necessary to include "where-
ever the person to take is ascertained."
TRA-NSFER BY INTER Vivos ALIENATION
Voluntary Alienation. The common law permitted the free
alienation of vested remainders by grant, but it did not allow
contingent remainders to be transferred by grant.41 As early as
Lampet's Case4 2 it was thought that a possibility could not
be assigned, for like the assignment of a chose in action it
4 0 The various syllabi to Tevis v. Tevis in 259 Mo. xg and 167 S. W.
oo3 may easily mislead the casual reader. It seems altogether improbable
that the court had in mind the rule of Goodright v. Searle noted above,
though this is a possible explanation. But even that rule does not
preclude a devise by an heir of a remainderman prior to the termination
of the particular estate. See Ingilby v. Ameotts (1856) 21 Beav. 585.
4 1 Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 366.
42 (1612) I0 Coke, 48a.
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would be the "occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits
of great oppression of the people," to use Lord Coke's expres-
sion.4 3  It was not unnatural that contingent remainders
should be put with choses in action as mere possibilities at a
time when they yet commanded very little respect from the
lawyers. But with their greater security in the law, there came
also some necessity of relaxing the rule against their alienability.
It was early held- that a contingent remainder could be released.14
If A conveys to B for life, remainder to C and his heirs if D sur-
vives B, C may release to A who has the reversion subject to the
contingent remainder and A will thereafter have the reversion
as though the contingent remainder had never been created. 45
Such a release operates by way of extinguishment. It seems
doubtful, however, whether C would have been permitted to
release to B and his heirs, for although most writers make no
restriction on the operation of the release,46 it seems strange that
C could release to B when he could not grant to D, inasmuch as
B's previous interest would not be affected by the release. It
would seem proper to say that a contingent remainder may be
released only where the result will be its extinguishment, i. e.,
it may be released only to that person whose interest would be
defeated or postponed by the vesting of the contingent remain-
der. 47  It seems doubtful, too, whether a release can be operative
48 It seems difficult to justify the statement in Williams, Real Property
(17th Int. ed.) p. 424, that the reason why a contingent remainder "so
long remained inalienable was simply because it had never been thought
worth while to make it alienable." This reason was accepted, however,
by BAKEWELL, J., in Lackland v. Nevins (1877) 3 Mo. App. 335, 339.
44 See Lampet's Case (1612) IO Coke, 48a; and Marks v. Marks (1718)
i Strange, 129, 132.
45 See Williams, Real Property (21St Int. ed.) p. 422, where it is said
that "the law, whilst it tolerated conditions of reentry and contingent
remainders, always gladly permitted such rights to be got rid of by
release, for the sake of preserving uninjured such vested estates as might
happen to be subsisting."
46 1 Preston, Estates, p. 89; Reeves, Real Property, § 904. See i6 Viner,
Abridgment, p. 461.
47 This distinction has been expressed very clearly by Professor Kales
in 2 ILLiNois LAW Rxv. 48, in comment on the dictum in Ortmayer v.
Elcock (907) 225 Ill. 342, that a contingent remainder may be released
to the life tenant. The result reached in .effers v. Lampson (1859) 10
Oh. St. 1o, and in Miller v. Emans (859) ig N. Y. 384, seems agree-
able to it. The result in Smith v. Pendell (1848) i9 Conn. 1o7 may be
explained on the ground that the remainder was vested, though the
court thought it contingent.
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when made by one who is not certain to take on the contingency,
i. e., where the remainder is to an unascertained person.48
A contingent remainder was susceptible of transfer by fine or
common recovery operating by way of estoppel, 49 so as to bind
the interest which thereafter vested. Similarly, it would seem
that -the American doctrine of estoppel by deed is applicable, so
that if one purports to convey land by a deed which contains
covenants sufficient to pass an after acquired title by estoppel,
he will not thereafter be permitted to assert a tile upon the
happening of a contingency upon which an estate vested in him ;5o
for the application of such an estoppel with such effect on a
contingent remainder, it would seem to be immaterial whether
the remainderman were ascertained at the time the deed was
executed.51 It would seem that a bare quit-claim deed should
not create such an estoppel,52 although where it is clearly the
intention of the parties to pass a contingent interest and there is
a valuable consideration, a court of equity may later enforce such
a transaction as an agreement to convey, of which specific per-
formance will be decreed after the happening of the contin-
gency.5 ' This, indeed, is the meaning of the frequent statement
that contingent remainders may be assigned in equity. It would
seem essential to equity's enforcement that the conveyance dis-
close an unmistakable intent to pass the future interes. If an
48 See I6 Viner, Abridgment, 463; Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and
Executory Interests, p. r84. Cf. Miller v. Emans (1859) ig N. Y. 384.
49 Fearne, Contingent Remainders, pp. 365, 366. In Doe d. Brune v.
Martin (1828) 8 B. & C. 524, BAY- Y, J., said that "a fine by a contingent
remainderman passes nothing, but leaves the right as it found it,....
it operates by estoppel only."
50 Robertson v. Wilson (I859) 38 N. H. 48; Walton v. Follansbee (189o)
131 IIl. 147. Cf. Stewart v. Neely (i89i) 139 Pa. St. 309.
51Robertson v. Wilson (1859) 38 N. H. 48; Tiffany, Real Property,
§ 129 n. Read v. Fogg (1872) 6o Maine, 479, was such a case; the
holding that there was no estoppel was based on the absence of a complete
covenant of warranty. In Dougal v. Fryer (1831) 3 Mo. 40, it was said
that "to pass an estate by estoppel the party must have had power to
pass it by a direct conveyance." Quaere, does this apply to contingent
remainders in Missouri?
52 See, however, Hannon v. Christopher (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 459, where
a-contrary view is expressd but not held.
53Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 550; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Juris-
prudence (3d ed.) § 1286; Hannon v. Christopher (i88i) 34 N. J. Eq. 459.
It is possible that a consideration of love and affection is sufficient for this
purpose. Fearne, Ibid., p. 549.
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estoppel is created, it is binding on the heir as well as on the
ancestor. " '
One of the first reforms accomplished, when the English law of
real property began to be overhauled, was to make contingent
remainders alienable. The Real Property Amendment Act"5 pro-
vides that "a contingent, an executory and a future interest, and
a possibility coupled with an interest . . . whether the object
of the gift or limitation of such interest or possibility be or be
not ascertained . . . may be disposed of by deed." It will
be noted that it was thought necessary to stipulate in this statute
concerning those cases in which the object or person is not
ascertained. The American statutes are usually less explicit, 6
and in many states where contingent remainders are made alien-
able by statute a question may still arise as to the possibility of
alienation where the person who is to enjoy the estate on a
contingency is not ascertained.
5 7
The Missouri statute, first passed in 1865, s authorizes the
conveyance of "lands or of hny estate or interest therein." Prior
to 1865, contingent remainders were probably alienable in Mis-
souri only as at common law, i. e., by release operating by way
of extinguishment and by some method of conveyance which
would create an estoppel; but it seems that the supreme court
was not called on to decide the question, and it is practically
impossible that a case should now arise which would involve it.
In Lackland v. Nevins," there was a devise in 1853 to a trustee
114 Weale v. Lower (1672) Poll. 54.
55 (1845) 8 & 9 Vict., c. io6.
56 For instance, the New York statute which has been copied in several
states merely provides that "an expectant estate is descendible, devisable,
and alienable, in the same manner as an estate in possssion." N. Y. Real
Property Laws, § 49. See Reeves, Real Property, § 9o4 note. For statutes
of other states see Stimson, American Statute Law, § i42o
6 7This question seems to have been recognized by the court in Putnam v.
Story (i882) 132 Mass. 205, although it was held that a presumptive heir
could alien his interest under a will which conferred a remainder on
"heirs." See also Whipple v. Fairchild (885) 139 Mass. 262. In Massa-
chusetts, contingent remainders seem to be alienable without reference
to statute. See Tiffany, Real Property, §-129.
58 Revised Statutes i865, c. iog, § I-now Revised Statutes 1909, § 2787.
There can be no doubt of the free alienability of vested remainders under
this statute. Byrne v. France (I895) 131 Mo. 639. On the general sub-
ject of -methods of conveyance in Missouri, see 8 Law Series, MissoUxI
BuLLEIIN, p. Ii et seq.
9 (877) 3 Mo. App. 335. The will in this case was construed in Hall v.
Howdeshell (863) 33 Mo. 475.
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for A for life. and if her husband survive her, remainder to her
brother and sisters.00 In 1854, one sister conveyed all her "right,
title and interest, whether in law or equity, as well in possession
or in expectancy," for a valuable consideration and it was held
that her contingent remainder passed, although it was not clear
whether it was intended that this result be rested on the statute, 61
or achieved apart from statute, or whether the court was giving
specific performance to the deed, treating it as a contract to con-
vey. The statute of 1865 was not in force when the deed was
executed, and could not have applied. The court denounced the
doctrine that contingent remainders are inalienable, as "contrary
to the policy of our system," ,but it is submitted that the result of
the case must be explained as a specific enforcement in equity of
the agreement found in the deed. It is improbable that other
cases of attempts to convey contingent remainders prior to 1865
will arise in the future, and any attempt dade since 1865 can
probably be rested on the statute.
Godman v. Simmons 2 arose under the statute of 1865; land
had been conveyed to A for life, remainder to her bodily heirs;
A's children conveyed their interests, one deed purporting to pass
the fee simple, one purporting to pass all interest "whether pres-
ent or prospective, vested or contingent," and one deed was in
the ordinary language of a quit-claim. A was survived by these
children, 63 and it was held in this action of ejectment that their
deeds were all effective to pass their contingent remainders. The
court was undoubtedly applying the statute of I865, although it
professed to be acting independently of it.64 No special attention
was given by the court to the question whether a contingent
remainder could be conveyed when the person to take is not cer-
0 It was thought to be unnecessary to decide whether it was a contingent
remainder or an executory devise to the brother and sisters.
61 The court referred to Wagner's Statutes, p. 272, § i. This is the same
as Revised Statutes 1865, c. lO9, § i, which was not enacted until eleven
years after the execution of the deed in question.
62 (1892) 113 Mo. 122. See also Enonerson v. Hughes (1892) no Mo.
629, where the same deed was construed to have created an estate tail.
This was criticized in i Law Series, MissouRi BULLETIN, p. 15. In Wood
v. Kice (i8go) 103 Mo. 329, the possibility of mortgaging a contingent
remainder seems to have been admitted.
63 It was held in Emmerson z. Hughes (1892) 1iO Mo. 627, that the
need of one child who failed to survive A passed nothing.
64 BP.AcE, J., who wrote the opinion, said: "This ancient common law
rule-that contingent remainders are inalienable, like the rule that choses
in action are not assignable-does not obtain in this state; not because
THE TRANSFER OF REMAINDERS
tain, although it was raised by counsel.65  Since the case was
treated as one of an estate tail, though improperly so, this ques-
tion may have been deemed less important by the court.68 The
dictum in Sikemeier v. Galvin67 seems to approve the same result
where no estate tail was involved. In Brown v. Fulkerson s there
is a still further extension; land was devised to C and the heirs
of her body with a gift over if she died without such heirs. Upon
the death of C without heirs of her body, the estate would have
devolved on her heirs under the statute of 1845 ;69 but it was held
that the deed of C's nieces and nephews who were her heirs, exe-
cuted before C's death, had effectively conveyed their interests.
Here the relationship was remote, and the uncertainty as to the
persons to take the contingent remainder was greater than in
Godman v. Simmons, but the alienability of the remainder was
none the less upheld.
In Finley v. Babb,70 where the remainder was in the 'heirs of the
life tenant, it was held that it was conveyed by a deed executed
by a son before the death of the life tenant. In Clark v. Sires,71
the remainder was in the life tenant's heirs of her body, with the
same result. Similar facts existed in Summet v. City Realt3
Co.7 2 where the court said that it had "uniformly held that con-
tingent remainders are alienable the same as are other estates."
It can no longer be doubted that a contingent remainder is an
there has been a positive statute abolishing these rules, but because they
are out of harmony with its general affirmative statute upon these sub-
jects, and long since have ceased-if they ever did exist-as rules govern-
ing the action of its citizens in the business relations of life."
65 In White v. McPheeters (1882) 75 Mo. 286, NORTON, J., had quoted
with approval the statement in 2 Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.)
§ 1557, that "if the contingency is in the person who is to take, as where
the remainder is limited to the heirs of one now alive, there is no one who
can make an effectual grant or devise of the remainder." The court in
White v. McPheeters thought that the contingent remainder in that case
was an alienable interest.
66 There is still some doubt as to the nature of the statutory remainder
in an estate tail, and this doubt may have influenced the court in Godman
v. Simmons. See i Law Series, MIssouRi BULLETIN, p. 19.
67 (1894) 124 Mo. 367.
68 (1894) 125 Mo. 400.
69 Brown v. Rogers (1894) 125 Mo. 3o2. For a criticism of this holding,
see i Law Series, MissouRY BULLETIN, p. 22.
70 (J902) 173 Mo. 257.
71 (J9o5) I93 Mo. 502.
72 (1907) 208 Mo. 501. In Armor v. Lewis (913) 252 Mo. 568, 589,
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"interest" in land within the meaning of the Missouri statute.
The early common-law view of contingent remainders as mere
"possibilities" may therefore have no place in Missouri law
to-day. Indeed, both vested and contingent remainders are mere
idealities; the one no less imaginary than the other;73 and the
time has come when both may be stripped of their feudal clothes
of uncertainty and put into a garb of substantial fiber. This
being true, it may well be doubted whether the distinction should
be continued between those contingencies which affect the person,
and those which affect the completeness of the title which is
conferred on an ascertained person.7 4  Although the Missouri
court has not expressly repudiated it, it is unlikely that it will be
respected since the decision in Brown v. Fulkerson, and it is
probably safe to say that any contingent remainder may be aliened
by deed under the statute, whether the object of the gift or lim-
itation of the remainder be or be not ascertained. Thus, the
Missouri court has read the explicit provision of the English
statute into Missouri law.
Of course the alienee of a contingent remainder takes it subject
to the contingency, just as the alienor had it.
75
Involuntary Alienation. The seizure of land on execution
depends entirely on statute. The Missouri statute of 1835 pro-
vided that the term "real estate" as used in the act on executions
should be construed "to include all estate and interest in lands,
tenements and hereditaments,17 6 and it has been continued in the
same form to the present time." There can be no doubt that a
vested remainder is subject to execution under this statute.7 8 It
BoN, J., dissenting, said: "That all estates in remainder are conveyable
by the owner and available to his creditors is uncontrovertible."
Equity will decree specific performance of a contract for the sale of
an alienable contingent remainder. Matter of Asch (1902) 75 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 486.
73 See Professor Kales' valuable discussion of this point in his book on
Future Interests in Illinois, § 78.
74 See 14 COLUMBIA LAW Rxv. 67.
75 Godman v. Simmons (189"2) 113 Mo. 122, 132. This is the explanation
of Emmerson v. Hughes (1892) iio Mo. 627. It will be noted that
Revised Statutes i9o9, § 2822, concerning the construction of the term
"real estate" has not been referred to in this discussion. It is believed
that it has no relevancy.
76 Revised Statutes 1835, p. 262, § 59.
77 Revised Statutes 1909, § 2194.
78 See Dunkerson v. Goldberg (i9o8) 162 Fed. 120.
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seems to have been thought at one time that this statute applied
only where the owner of an interest was in some way seised, 
7
and if this view had been continued, the statute probably would
not have included contingent remainders. But in White v.
McPheeters,80 where land had been conveyed to a trustee for A
for life, remainder in fee to her husband should he survive her,
with power in A and her husband to direct a conveyance during
their joint lives, it was held that the interest of the husband
whether vested or contingent (it was plainly the latter) was
subject to his creditor's rights to reach it for satisfaction of their
debts, and that the joint deed of A and her husband, while the
latter was insolvent, was not effective to bar his creditors. While
the court was very clearly of the opinion that a contingent
remainder was subject to execution under the statute, it must be
admitted that the authority of the case on that point is weakened
by the fact that the husband and wife also had a power of
appointment, the attempted exercise of which in favor of a
volunteer rendered the property subject to the claims of his
creditors. On this ground the case was distinguished by the
United States Supreme Court.81 Even if White v. McPheeters
is not actual authority, there can be little doubt that a contingent
remainder is subject to execution under the Missouri statute, at
least where the person to take is ascertained; and in view of the
application of the statute on conveyances in Brow% v. Fulkerson,
even where the person is not ascertained the contingent remain-
der may be an "interest" which is subject to execution.82
It seems to follow from a contingent remainder's being sub-
ject to execution that it should be treated as part of the assets of a
bankrupt or insolvent. This is the prevailing view under the
Bankruptcy Act8 which provides that all property which the
71 McIlvaine v. Smith (1867) 42 Mo. 45.
so (1882) 75 Mo. 286. Cf. Watson v. Dodd (1873) 68 N. C. 528, where
a court of equity refused to order the sale of a contingent remainder,
there being no apparent statutory authority; followed in Howbert v.
Cawthorn (19o2) ioo Va. 649, which is criticized in 16 HAv. LAW REV.
377. See also Daniels v. Eldredge (1878) 125 Mass. 356; Tiffany, Real
Property, § 129.
81 In Brandeis v. Cochrane (1884) 112 U. S. 344.
82 But see Roundtree v. Roundtree (1887) 62 S. C. 450. In Illinois, there
is at least doubt as to a contingent remainder's being subject to execution.
Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 8o. Cf. Hill v. Hill (914) 264
Ill. 289.
8 Bankruptcy Act, § 7oa (5).
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bankrupt "could by any means have transferred or which might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him," shall pass to the trustee in bankruptcy,8 4 although it may be
necessary that the person to take should be ascertained. 5 The
question does not seem to have arisen in Missouri.
Both vested and contingent remainders may be made the sub-
ject of taxation. The collection of inheritance taxes is probably
seldom attempted until the estate vests in possession. It would
seem that an inheritance tax imposed after the creation of a
contingent remainder in a will is not collectible when the estate
vests in possession."8
Partition. The partition of lands is a means of transferring
interests which may be voluntary or compulsory. Voluntary
partition between contingent remaindermen may be effected by
conveyances of the contingent interests which will operate as any
other conveyances, but the anomalous doctrine of parol partition
probably has no application because of the necessity that such
partition be followed by possession." The common law did
not permit the compulsory partition of estates not lying in
possession.""
Compulsory partition is now entirely regulated by statute.
The Missouri statute has long provided for partition "in all cases
where lands, tenements or hereditaments are held in joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, or coparcenary, including estates in fee, for
life, or for years, tenancy by the curtesy and in dower," and any
party interested may ask "for the admeasurement and setting off
84 Clowe v. Seavey (1913) 2o8 N. Y. 496. See also National Park Bank
v. Billings (ig1) App. Div. (N. Y.) 536; 14 COLUMBIA LAw REv. 66.85 In re Wetmore (igoi) io8 Fed. 52o; Goodwin v. Banks (i898) 87
Md. 425. In Clowe v. Seavey (913) 208 N. Y. 496, a statute made it
unnecessary that the person be ascertained. In I Preston, Estates, p. 76,
it is 'apprehended" that a remainder to an unascertained person is not
"transferable to assignees under a commission of bankrupt."
8
6In re Smith (1912) 135 N. Y. S. 240; 12 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 727.
87 Nave v. Smith (1888) 95 Mo. 596. See Tiffany, Real Property, § 174.
8 8 Evans v. Bagshaw (1869) L. R. 8 Eq. 469, (1870) L. R. 5 Ch. App.
340. See however Fitts v. Craddock (i9o6) i44 Ala. 437, 113 A. S. R.
53; Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition (2d ed.) § 44o. At common law,
a tenancy in parcenary could be partitioned on a writ of partition, but
the partition of joint tenancies and tenancies in common depended on the
early statutes of 3I & 32 Henry VIII. Equity's jurisdiction of suits for
partition was later. See Gudgell v. Mead (1843) 8 Mo. 53; Tiffany, Real
Property, § 175.
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of any dower interest therein, if any, and for the partition of
the remainder, if the same can be done without great prejudice
to the parties in interest; and if not, then for the sale of the
premises and a division of the proceeds thereof among all of the
parties, according to their respective rights and interests."
8' 9  It
is also provided that "where any party's interest is uncertain or
contingent, or the ownership of the inheritance shall depend upon
an executory devise, or the remainder shall be contingent so
that such parties cannot be named, the same shall be so stated in
the petition." 90  This clearly contemplates that the existence of
uncertain future interests shall be no bar to partition. To deter-
mine the extent to which contingent future interests may be
partitioned under this statute, requires a close analysis of the
cases.
Reinders v. Koppelmanin9 is the first leading case. The plain-
tiff was in possession as owner of an estate pur autre vie, and he
was also owner of one-fourth of one-half of the remainder; the
other half of the remainder had been devised to the "nearest and
lawful heirs" of the testator, and his widow who was still alive.
The owners of the three-fourths of the first half, the heirs of the
testator, and certain other persons denominated the "ostensible
heirs" of the testator's widow, were made defendants. The court
admitted that the heirs of the widow could not be determined
until her death, but held that under the statute above quoted their
interest constituted no bar to the partition.
9 2  It will be observed
89 Revised Statutes I9o9, § 2559, first enacted in its present form in
Revised Statutes I865, p. 611. But the earlier statute in Revised Statutes
1825, p. 6og, was not very different.
90 Revised statutes i9o9, § 2563. The substance of this section first
appeared in Reised Statutes 1835, p. 422, § 4. One who may contest the
will and if successful take by descent, has not a contingent interest within
the meaning of the statute. Robertson v. Brown (19o4) x87 Mo. 452.
91 (1878) 68 Mo. 482. Simmons v. MacAdaras (1878) 6 Mo. App. 297
was decided about the same time as Reinders v. Koppelmann, but it seems
to have been wholly neglected in later decisions. The suit was begun
by the owner of one-third of a leasehold and one-half of the reversion,
and the lower court had ordered a sale of the property as a whole. The
St. Louis Court of Appeals held this to be error, although leave was
given to the plaintiff to ask for the separate partition of the leasehold,
and of the reversion. See also Reinhardt v. Wendeck (1867) 40 Mo. 577.
92 The court relied on Wills v. Slade (i8oi) 6 Ves. 498, Gaskell v. Gas-
kell (1836) 6 Sim. Ch. 643 and Mead v. Mitchell (I858) 17 N. Y. 2io.
In all of these cases there were several cotenants of vested present estates,
and the principle of representation was applied as to the future estates.
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that the interest of the plaintiff in this case was definite and vested,
and that he also had a vested pur autre vie. The contingent
interest represented not more than one-fourth of the remainder.
It is difficult to reconcile the court's statements that "the parties
not in esse are represented by those who take subject to their
rights," and that such persons not in esse cannot be made parties
to the suit "except by naming the owner of the particular estate
to which, on certain contingencies, they become entitled." The
possibility of a merger of a portion of the particular estate in the
remainder was not mentioned by court or counsel, and the case
may be distinguished on the ground that a merger had occurred.9"
In Preston v. Brant,4 it was held that partition could be main-
tained by two remaindermen against the life tenant and the other
remainderman, the remainder being vested. No contingent inter-
ests were involved and the court's reliance on Reinders v. Koppel-
mann would seem to have been misplaced. In Atkinson v.
Brady," a tenant by curtesy who also owned one-fifth of the
93 It seems clear that there may be a merger in such a case. The ques-
tion of a merger pro tanto was raised but not decided in Simmons v.
MacAdaras (1878) 6 Mo. App. 297, and it might have been raised in Burns
v. Bangert (1887) 92 Mo. 167 and in Atkinson v. Brady (1892) 114 Mo.
200. If A is sole tenant for life, with remainder to B and C in fee, and
.if A conveys his life estate to B, there will be a merger as to a moiety;
if A and B are joint tenants or tenants in common for life, with
remainder to C in fee, and if A conveys his estate to C, there should like-
wise be a merger as to a moiety. 3 Preston, Conveyancing, p. 89; Clark
v. Parsons (1897) 69 N. H. 147; Harrison v. Moore (1894) 64 Conn.
344; Fox v. Long (1871) 8 Bush (Ky.) 551. But see contra, Johnson
v. Johnson (1863) 7 Allen (Mass.) 196. If A and B are tenants in com-
mon for life, remainder (without distinguishing the moieties) to C and
D in fee, and if A conveys his estate to C, there would seem to be a:
merger only as to one-half of A's estate. 3 Preston, Conveyancing, p.
ioo. But cf. Badeley v. Vigurs (1854) 4 E. & B. 71. It is hardly neces-
sary to add that a vested estate will not merge into a contingent
remainder.
94 (1888) 96 Mo. 552. This case was followed in Hayes v. McReynolds
(1898) 144 Mo. 348; and in Doerner v. Doerner (1goo) 161 Mo. 399. It
is sometimes said that the plaintiff in partition must have actual or con-
structive possession. See Chamberlain v. Waples (9o5) 193 Mo. 96. But
what is really meant is that the defendant shall not have a possession
adverse to the plaintiff. See Rozier v. Griffith (186o) 31 Mo. 171. In
Rhorer v. Brockhage (1883) 13 Mo. App. 397, it was said by THoMpsoN,
J., for the St. Louis Court of Appeals that "the statute of partition does
not contemplate the partition of reversionary interests."
95 (892) 114 Mo. 200.
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vested remainder was permitted to maintain partition as to the
remainder against the other remaindermen; the court seemed
to rely on the phrase in the statute "for the admeasurement and
setting off of any dower interest therein, if any, and for the parti-
tion of the remainder," but it may be doubted whether the word
"remainder" in this statute is to 'be given its artful meaning. In
remanding the case to the trial court, the Supreme court directed
a partition "subject to the curtesy." The possibility of a merger
of one-fifth of the curtesy in the remainder was not noted. No
reason is perceived why such a merger should not have occurred,
and if it did occur the partition might have been subject to four-
fifths of the curtesy.
In Sikemeier v. Galvin,96 a testator devised land to his daughter
for life and on her death to her heirs, and provided that at any
time the land might be sold "by the concurrence in the deed, as
parties, of the ostensible heirs," but that the proceeds were to be
reinvested after such sale, subject to the interests created by the
will. The daughter and one of her sisters who was a possible
heir brought suit for partition against the other sister and her
two brothers, and a demurrer by the defendants was sustained
below. This was held to be error on the authority of Reinders v.
Koppelmann, but it will be noted that since neither of the plain-
tiffs had a vested interest in the remainder that case was not con-
trolling. The existence of a reversion in the testator's heirs sub-
ject to the vesting of the remainder in the daughter's heirs was
not noted; probably all the heirs of the testator were parties to
the suit. Sikemeier v. Galvin would seem to have permitted
partition by one contingent remainderman against the others, the
life tenant also being a party plaintiff. But since the parties
included all of the "ostensible heirs," the authority of the case is
much weakened by the provision in the will for a conveyance by
them. The case has been explained in Stockwell v. Stockwel
9 7
on the ground that it was decided only that the "partition was
a mode of alienation and reinvestment to which the parties might
resort in carrying out these provisions of the will;" but it is
submitted that his explanation neglects the fact that some of
the parties were thus being forced to convey against their will.
96 (1894) I24 Mo. 367.
OT (1914) 262 Mo. 671, 686. On p. 685, the court through BROWN, C.,
stated that in Sikemeier v. Galvin all the "ostensible heirs" were peti-
tioners, but this seems to be an error for the report distinctly states that
some of them were defendants and demurred.
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In Sparks v. Clay,98 where an undivided one-fourth of a tract
of land was conveyed to A for life and remainder to her heirs,
it was held that a child of A, born after final judgment in a par-
tition suit to which A was a party, was bound by the judgment
in that suit. A was one of the four tenants in common, two of
whom were owners of present estates in fee simple, and on the
doctrine of representation of persons not in esse as announced in
Reinders v. Koppelmann, A was therefore entitled to represent her
unborn children. In Acord v. Beaty,99 the doctrine of repre-
sentation of remaindermen not in esse by the owner of the par-
ticular estate was applied to a voluntary partition between various
life tenants, which was shown to be "fair and equal when made,"
and in which the deeds provided for the interests of the remain-
dermen.'9 0
In Hill v. Hill,' it was held that the partition sought would
contravene the intention of the testator, and the court's expres-
sion of disapproval of Reinders v. Koppelmann and Sikemeier v.
Galvin would seem to have been gratuitous. This led to the
decision in Stockwell v. Stockwell; °2 land had been conveyed to
A and her bodily heirs, and A and one of her two children sought
partition in a suit against the other. Clearly a reversion
remained in the grantor subject to the vesting of the statutory
remainders of the estate, yet neithei he nor his heirs was joined. 10 3
This alone, should have been sufficient for disposing of the case;
but the court expressed the opinion that the contingent interests
were not susceptible of partition. The attempt to explain the
decision in Sikemeier v. Galvin is not convincing," 4 and if it were
98 (i904) 185 MO. 393.
99 (1912) 244 Mo. 126.
100 The voluntary parol partition in Gulick v. Huntley (i898) 144 Mo.
24I, was contrary to the provisions of the will and hence the question of
representation did not arise. A partition will not be made where it would
defeat a testator's intention. Revised Statutes, igog, § 2569; Cubbage v.
Franklin (1876) 62 Mo. 364; Stewart v. Jones (1909) 219 Mo. 614.
101 (1914) 261 Mo. 55.
102 (1914) 262 Mo. 671. In so far as it attempts a history of estates tail
in Missouri, the opinion in this case is grossly inadequate. See i Law
Series, MissouRI BULLETIN, p. ii.
L03 The grantor was doubtless dead, although the fact does not clearly
appear except in the objection that his heirs were not joined. On the
effect of a failure to join parties having vested interests in a partition
proceeding, see Hiles v. Rule (1893) 121 Mo. 248; Cochran v. Thomas
(895) 131 Mo. 258.
104 See ante, p. 45.
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not for the fact that the result may clearly be rested on the
failure to join all necessary parties, the decision would have the
effect of overruling that case.
It is apparent from this review of the decisions that the last
word has not been spoken concerning the partition of remainders.
In the simple case where A is tenant for life, with remainder to
B and his heirs, neither A nor B is entitled to partition, for there
is in no sense a cotenancy. Where A and B are tenants for the
life of A, remainder to -C and his heirs, either A or B may par-
tition without in any way affecting the remainder. If A owns
one-half of a tract in fee, the other half being vested in B for
life, remainder to B's heirs, either A or B may have partition and
B would represent his heirs sufficiently to bind them; if the
remainder is to the heirs of C, B as tenant of the particular
estate may possibly represent C's heirs so as to bind them.1 "
Where A is sole tenant for life, with the remainder in fee vested
in B and C, Preston v. Brant would seem to permit either B or C
to maintain partition against the other and A may be joined as
a party, although it seems clear that A's interest would not neces-
sarily be affected in such a case.1 6  If A is sole tenant for life
and owner of a part of a vested remainder, 107 it would seem
that he may maintain partition as to the remainder against the
other owners of the remainder, if their interests are vested;1O8
105 In Betz v. Farling (19z6) 274 Ill. 1o7, A and B were tenants in com-
mon for their respective lives, with remainders as to the share of each to
his surviving children and if one left no surviving child, remainder
to the children of the other. A died leaving children one of whom was
permitted to maintain partition against the others and B and his living
children.
106 See also Hayes v. McReynolds (1898) 144 Mo. 348. Cf. Doerner v.
Doerner (19oo) I6i Mo. 399. The general rule in other states is contra.
See 32 A. S. R. 780. In Haenssler v. Missouri Iron Co. (1892) iio Mo.
i88, partition was decreed subject to a perpetual mining lease. In Beckner
v. McLinn (189i) io7 Mo. 277, a homestead was included in the partition
sale under the statutory provision.
107 If the court were pressed to decide that there is a merger in such a
case, the result of the partition suit would probably be the same. In
Jameson v. Hayward (1895) xo6 Cal. 682, there were several owners of
a term and one of them owned the reversion; the court ordered a parti-
tion of the term only, leaving the reversion unaffected and ignoring the
merger on equitable grounds.
108 Atkinson v. Brady (1892) 114 Mo. 200.
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and if their interests are contingent Reinders v. Koppelrnann
would seem to permit partition wherever the principle of repre-
sentation of persons not in esse can be applied; but the authority
of that decision is weakened since the decisions in Hill v. Hill
and Stockwell v. Stockwell, and the narrowing of its doctrine
may now be expected. If A is tenant for life, with a contingent
remainder to other persons, it would seem folly to permit any
partition even though A be joined as a party, and Sikemeier v.
Galvin is to be confined to its actual facts if indeed it is not to be
abandoned altogether since the decision of Stockwell v. Stock-
well; if A is not joined, and if one possible remainderman seeks
partition against the others, clearly it should be denied because
of the interest of the reversioners; nor should partition be
decreed if the reversioners are joined, for there can be no definite
basis for division pending the contingency, and if a sale were
decreed, the whole proceeding would be idle in that no advance
is made toward division.
0 9
Originally the object of partition was to enable cotenants to
enjoy peaceful possession. It was distinctly a remedy to facili-
tate the enjoyment of present estates in possession. But the
broad terms of the Missouri statute seem to have authorized its
extension to such future interests as vested remainders although
the actual step was taken in Reinders v. Koppelmann and Preston
v. Brant apparently without appreciation of its significance. But
it seems undesirable that this principle should be extended to
permit the partition of contingent future interests, and Stockwell




109 This has been recognized by the Illinois court which has persistently
refused to permit partition of remainders after a life estate where the
interests of the remaindermen could not be definitely ascertained until the
death of the life tenant. Seymour v. Bowles (1898) 172 Ill. 521; Ruddell
v. Wren (1904) 208 Ill. 5o8. And partition was recently refused where
the remainder was "vested in quality" but "contingent in quantity."
Richardson v. VanGundy (i916) 271 Ill. 476.
